{
  "author": "Maclain Hunter",
  "title": "Human Reason and Reason in General by Maclain Hunter",
  "identifier": "hunter-human-reason-general-reason",
  "sourceKind": "authored-foundational-record",
  "content": "Human Reason and Reason in General by Maclain Hunter: \n\nPremises: \n\nP: Human reasoning is a form of Reason that can be dynamic or static, coherent or incoherent, consistent with the logically contingent nature of human rationality. \n\nQ: Reason (as it is in general/universally) is dynamic (infinite - not merely static or local) yet coherent, open to all feasible truths and statement’s while not falling into contradiction. This consistent Universal Logical Framework (logically equivalent to coherent Reason and/or Logic) is what allows for humanity to be humanity and human reason to be human reason. \n\nR: It would be a contradiction that would render human reason “not Reason” (necessarily and in any context) if human reason could not be Reason (coherent with Logos).\n\nS: Assume ~(P, Q, R). This leads to logical contradiction where human reason could exist without Reason in general or without being potentially coherent with Reason in general. Therefore P, Q, and R must be true making conclusions drawn from them true also. \n\nFormal Argument (Proof):\n\n{P, Q, R, S} |= (P & Q) & (R & S)\n\nConclusion: (P & Q) & (R & S): \n\n“Reason in General” (Logos - Universal Logic) underlies human identity and reasoning and enables the existence of contingent concepts like humanity and human reason. Reason in General and the objective coherence of Universal Reason (Logos) allows for coherence in general and coherence in human identity and reasoning, allowing for people to be people long enough and consistently enough to gain true knowledge through consistent and coherent human reason and Universal Reason (Logos).",
  "formal": null,
  "structuredAuthoredProof": null,
  "authoredSteps": null,
  "recordedAt": "2026-10-03T01:36:20.318Z",
  "originalAuthoredAt": null,
  "propositionMeaningBoundary": "Atomic identifiers retain their meanings in the exact source. No arbitrary truth assignment establishes an ontological or empirical premise; the formal witness checks the written inference."
}